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Methodology 
Multiple attribute scenarios, bounded probabi- 
lities, and threats of nuclear theft 
Craig \V. Kirkwood and Stephen M. Pollock 
X method is presented for developing descriptions of future scenarios 
and using expert judgment to assess bounds on the probabilities of these 
scenarios. Multiple attributes are used to describe the important 
features of the scenarios, and the scenarios are defined as collections of 
different possible levels of the attributes. Experts assess either numerical 
values or bounds on various unconditional and conditional probabilities 
for different attribute le\.els. These are used to establish constraints for a 
series of linear programs which are solved to determine the highest and 
lowest possible probabilities for each scenario. An application is 
uresented to the assessment of ootential threats against nuclear material 
hateguards systems. 
L 
Kq~ordst planning; scenarios; nuclear safeguards 
Systematic planning for the future 
usually involves forecasting relevant 
future conditions. Significant features of 
the future are often uncertain, and it is 
desirable to account explicitly for these 
uncertainties in planning. The use of 
scenarios-internally consistent descrip- 
tions of possible future conditions and 
events-has expanded over the past 15 
years. C\‘ith this approach, several 
different scenarios are constructed 
which cover the range of possible future 
conditions, and the probability of each 
future scenario is estimated. This 
information is then used in planning and 
decision making. 
One difficulty with this method is that 
historical information may be only 
indirectly relevant to estimation of pro- 
babilities for future scenarios, and it 
may thus be necessary to use some other 
method to determine these probabilities. 
This paper presents a method for using 
expert judgment to do this which over- 
comes certain limitations of past 
approaches. M’e also present an appli- 
cation of the method. 
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Background 
The use of scenarios in planning has 
received increasing attention over the 
past 15 years.1 In this section we review 
cross-impact analysis (which is closely 
related to the work presented here) and 
discuss limitations in previous methods 
for implementing this approach. The 
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basic features of cross-impact analysis 
are illustrated by SMIC 74,’ in which 
the following steps are carried out: 
Events e,, ez, . , e, are constructed, 
each being considered relevant to the 
scenarios of interest. 
The unconditional probabilityp(e$ of 
each event occurring is assessed from 
experts. 
The conditional probabilities p(e; ej) 
and p(e; e$ are also assessed, where ej 
is the complement ofeJ:. 
The assessed information is corrected 
so that for the finai results 
0 Gp(e,) 6 1, 
P(&j) P(q) = /J(ejiei) p(eJ, and 
P(4-j) P(ej) + P(e;lej) = p(e;). 
The correction procedure involves 
minimizing a quadratic difference 
function subject to meeting the con- 
straints given in step 4 above. Various 
authors have pointed out limitations in 
the original SMIC 74 procedures and 
have suggested modifications.’ In par- 
ticular, Mitchell and Tydeman+ have 
demonstrated the subtleties involved in 
eliciting conditional probabilities when 
an implicit time dependence between 
events of interest can influence the 
experts’ probability assessments. 
Mitchell and Tydeman emphasize the 
need to carefully consider the order of 
temporally sequenced events if elicited 
probabilities are to be meaningful. 
These authors address inconsistencies in 
assessed probabilities by hypothesizing 
that there is a true or consistent value for 
each inconsistent probability assessed 
by the experts, and using mathematical 
programming methods to estimate a 
consistent set of probabilities that is as 
close as possible to the experts’ assess- 
ments. 
Sarin has proposed a somewhat dif- 
ferent approach where probability 
information on events is collected 
sequentially from experts.” A computer 
program is used to check the consistency 
of the elicited information with the 
axioms of probability. If the information 
is consistent, then bounds on feasible 
values of the joint and conditional 
probabilities p(ei, 5) and p(e; 5) are cal- 
culated and presented to the experts. 
The experts continue to provide addi- 
tional information until the calculated 
bounds are considered tight enough. 
These approaches to determining 
scenario probabilities have two limita- 
tions. First, the number ofscenarios that 
must be considered can quickly become 
excessive; 10 binary events will give 2”’ 
= 1024 different possible scenarios. 
Mitchell, Tydeman and Curnoti show 
that a large fraction of these can each 
have a non-negligible probability. Not 
only may it be difficult to analyse all 
these scenarios, it may not be necessary 
to consider this much detail for the 
planning problem of interest. 
A second limitation is that they deal 
with binary events which either do, or do 
not, occur; in many planning problems, 
it is more natural to consider attributes 
(factors) which can take on more than 
two different levels. For example, there 
is no natural way to describe the price of 
oil simply in terms of events either 
occurring or not. 
In the next section we discuss a new 
approach which addresses these two 
limitations. 
Approach 
Our basic approach can be illustrated 
by a simplified example. Suppose an 
electric utility is deciding whether to 
plan construction of either a coal- or an 
oil-fired steam turbine power plant to 
supply its customers from 1995 to 2035. 
To assist in its planning, the utility 
wishes to consider possible scenarios for 
conditions in that time period. Two 
factors, relative cost (el) and regulations 
(eJ, are considered relevant. These 
factors can take on the following levels: 
er = 
1: coal is substantially 
cheaper than oil, 
2: the two fuels have 
similar costs, and 
3: oil is substantially 
cheaper than coal. 
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1: regulations forbid use 
ez = 
of oil, and 
2: regulations permit use 
of oil. 
There are six scenarios, or different 
possible combinations of these factors. 
However, let us assume that for plan- 
ning purposes the utility need only 
consider the following four scenarios: 
s,: regulations forbid use of oil; 
As,: regulations permit use ofoil, and 
oil is substantially cheaper than 
coal; 
&: regulations permit use ofoil, and 
the two fuels have similar costs; 
and 
S,: regulations permit use ofoil, and 
coal is substantially cheaper 
than oil. 
While experts might provide probability 
information in terms of er and es, it is 
only necessary to obtain probabilities for 
S1, S,, S,, and S,. If joint probabilities 
are available over e, and es, then it is 
straightforward to obtain probabilities 
for the scenarios. 
In this illustration, the saving 
obtained by defining the four scenarios 
is not great: there are only two more 
possible combinations of et and e2 than 
scenarios. In the application discussed 
below, there are eight attributes with a 
total of 512 different possible com- 
binations of levels-but only 19 
scenarios are needed to adequately 
describe possible future conditions for 
planning purposes. Since it will be 
necessary only to obtain the probabili- 
ties for these 19 scenarios, considerably 
less elicitation wifl be needed than if 
probabilities were to be obtained for all 
5 12 possible combinations of attribute 
IeveIs. 
Our approach to determining 
scenario probabilities, based on the 
ideas just illustrated, has the following 
steps: 
1. Determine a set of discrete valued 
attributes e,, e,, . . . , e, which cover 
all concerns that are relevant for the 
planning problem of interest. 





Determine the set of relevant 
scenarios for the planning problem. 
This set will be collectively exhaust- 
ive and mutually exclusive over the 
possible combinations ofe,, e,, _ . _ , 
en. 
Assess, with an expert, information 
about unconditional probabilities, 
conditional probabilities and joint 
probabilities over the attributes et, 
e2, . . . . e,, which he or she can 
provide. 
Determine whether the assessed 
probabilities are consistent with the 
axioms of probability theory. If not, 
resolve the inconsistencies with the 
expert; if so, determine upper and 
lower bounds on the probability of 
each scenario that are consistent 
with the assessed information. 
If these bounds are sufficiently tight 
for planning purposes, stop; other- 
wise, assess additional information 
and redetermine the bounds. 
Note that step 3 does not require 
assessments for prespecilied sets of 
unconditional, conditional, or joint 
probabilities. The respondent need only 
assess those probabilities with which he 
or she is comfortable. 
For notational convenience, let T 
represent the set of all possible com- 
binations of en e2, . . . , e,, let t represent 
a specific element in T, and /+ represent 
the probability of t. Now consider an 
elicitation procedure that allows an 
expert to provide numerical judgmental 
values, or upper or lower bounds, for: 
i. unconditional probabilities for any 
attribute, or 
ii. conditional probabilities for any 
single attribute, given information 
about the other attributes. 
In addition, let the procedure allow: 
iii. comparison of the magnitude of the 
probabilities of any two specific 
elements t and u in T. 
The representation of this information 
in terms ofpt is given as follows: 
Unconditioned ~rob~~~~~t~e~. Let EQ 
represent all elements in Tsuch that e; = 
j. Then an assessed unconditional 
probability Prob(ei = j} =p, as discussed 
in item i above, imposes the constraint: 
c P, =p. (la) 
teEi 
An assessed upper bound Prob{ei = j} < 
p imposes 
CC 6 P, (lb) 
teEi 





Conditional Probabilities. Let E, 
represents a specified set of levels for all 
attributes except the till. The conditional 
probability that the iIh attribute equals 
ei, given the other attributes are in Ei, 
will be denoted P(e; E,); further, let 
(ei,&) be the set of t such that the 
ilhattribute equals e; and the other 
attributes are in Ei. Then an assessed 
conditional probability p’, as discussed 
in item ii above, imposes one of the 
following constraints: 
P(eil&i) d p’, @a) 
P(eil&) = p’ or (2b) 
P(eilEi) 3p’ (2c) 
Here Equation (2a) applies when an 
upper bound is assessed, (2b) when a 
specific numerical value is assessed, and 
(2~) when a lower bound is assessed. 
The expressions in Equation (2) can 
be rewritten in terms ofp, by applying 
standard conditional and total 
probability definitions: 
c p/_pr c Pt so, 
t&(ei,Ei) tEE, 
(3a) 
comparison of probabilities for two 
specific elements in T, as discussed in 
item iii above, imposes one of the 
following constraints: Pl greater than, 
equal to, or less than P,. 
Bounds on scenario probabilities. Let S,, 
S,, . . . , S, represent the set ofscenarios 
used, where this set is collectively 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive over 
T. Then the upper bound on the 
probability, P(Si) ofSi occurring, where 
Wi) = 2 P,, (-1) 
tes, 
can be found by solving the linear 
program 
maximize 2 p/ (5a) 
[Pr, tET] t&S, 
subject to 
{assessed constraints of type (5b) 
(l), (3), and (4)) 
cp,= 1 (5c) 
tET 
and 
p1 s 0, tET (5d) 
Similarly, the lower bound on P(Si) can 
be found by solving the linear program 
minimize 2 pt 
[PI, t&T] t&S, 
subject to Equations (5b, c, d). 
(Gal 
(6b) 
Thus, to find the bounds on the 
probabilities for each of the m scenarios, 
it is necessary to solve 2m linear 
programs. M’ith current linear 
programming computer packages this is 
inexpensive, even for large problems. In 
the event there is no feasible set ofpt, the 
phase I portion of the simplex solution 
algorithm will automatically identify 
this. 
or it is equal to zero, (3b) 
or it is greater than zero. (3c) 
Magnitude of two elements. The 
Although the theoretical formulation 
presented above is straightforward, 
keeping track of the E+p, Ei, p’, and S, in 
an actual application requires 
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developing special procedures. In the 
next section, we discuss an application 
of the approach and procedures for data 
handling. Similar procedures should be 
applicable to a variety of planning 
problems. 
Application 
The application discussed below was 
carried out as part ofa study to assist the 
University of California Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory in the 
development of methods to analyse and 
evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards 
Systems (NMSS). Our study 
concentrated 011 developing a 
methodology to assist experts in 
describing in quantitative form their 
judgments about scenarios 
characterizing potential threats to steal 
material from a NMS system. (Such a 
system is a combination of guards, 
alarms, procedures, and other steps 
taken at a facility handling nuclear 
materials to keep the material safe from 
hostiie action.) The ultimate purpose for 
developing these scenarios, and their 
associated probabilities, was to aid 
design work to improve the performance 
of NMS systems. 
To develop scenarios and associated 
probabilities, we followed the live-step 
process discussed in the last section. Our 
main purpose was development of 
methodoIogy, and the work presented 
below does not represent a final 
characterization ofadversaries. 
During Step 1 of our process, eight 
attributes were determined to character- 
ize potential adversaries (see Table 11, 
and the scales also shown in the Table 
were constructed to describe possible 
levels ofeach attribute that an adversary 
might possess. Standard decision ana- 
lysis methods were used in determining 
the attributes and scales.7 Care was 
taken to assure that the set of scales was 
complete, nonr~dundant, operational, 
and of minimum size. 
With the attribute levels shown in 
Table 1, there are 4 x 27 = 512 different 
possible scenarios characterizing adver- 
saries. However, examination of the 
various different possible combinations 
of attribute levels showed that many of 
these would pose similar threats to a 
NMS system. Since the planning prob- 
lem ofinterest was to assist in improving 
such systems, there was no need to dis- 
tinguish between different adversaries 
who posed similar threats. 
A detailed consideration of the 
various possible threat scenarios, 
carried out during Step 2 of the process 
discussed in the last section, identified 
the 19 distinct threat scenarios des- 
cribed in Table 2. 
These scenarios are more explicitly 
described as collections of the 5 12 differ- 
ent types of adversaries delined by the 
various possible combinations of attri- 
bute levels in Table 1. To represent 
conveniently the scenario definitions, a 
straightforward coding procedure was 
used. For example, the code 
(3,1,1,&l, l&l ) represents an adversary 
whose motivation is extortion (level 3 of 
the first attribute on Table I), and who 
has high levels of N;MS system 
information and technical information, 
low consequence information, high 
levels of processing capability and 
general resources, and is risk-avoiding 
for himself but risk-seeking for others. If 
any entry is zero, there is no restriction 
on that particular attribute, and so the 
code refers to a coliection of more than 
one of the 512 possible adversaries. 
Thus, the code (3,0,1,0,0,0,~,0) 
represents all adversary descriptions 
where the motivation is extortion and 
there is a high level of technical 
information. 
Each of the 19 threat scenarios in 
Table 2 was represented in terms of this 
code. Thus, for example, scenario 1 
(Uninformed Outsider) had code 
(1,2,2,0,0,0,0,0), scenario 8 
(Embezzling Executive) had code 
(2,1,1~0,0,2,0,0) and scenario 14 
(Outside Expert) had code 
(3,2,1,~,0,2,0,0). A description of the 
codes for all scenarios is given by 
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TABLE 1. ADVERSARY Al-TRIBUTES AND SCALES 
Attribute 
1 Motivation 






5 Processing capa- 
bility 
6 General resources 




Reason a thefl is attempted 
Level of knowledge about the 
operation of Nuclear Material Safe- 
guards Systems 
Level of knowledge about nuclear 
materials, their handling, and their 
processing 
Level of knowledge about possible 
legal, financial, social, and health 
consequences of a theft attempt 
Equipment and expertise available 
to process stolen nuclear material 
Resources, such as equipment and 
number of personnel, available to 
aid in theft attempt 
Willingness of adversary to risk his 
own life and welfare 
Willingness of adversary to risk 





















Symbolic: eg game playing prank, 
crazy, personal revenge, for principle, 
publicity for a cause, cover-up of 
material unaccount for 
Money: To make money by sale of the 
material or ransom for its safe return 
Extortion: Theft for nonmonetary gain 
(eg poliiical gain, job restitution, 
prisoner release) 
Weapon: Theft to make a weepon for 
eventual use (eg explosive device or 
radiation dispersal weapon) 
High: Considerable knowledge of and 
control over at least one aspect of the 
Nuclear Material Safeguards System 
Low: Has only the knowledge available 
to someone outside the NMS system 
High: Has significant knowledge about 
nuclear science, computer technology, 
electronics, and related areas 
Low: Does not have significant know- 
ledge about these areas 
High: Fullunderstandingofthepossible 
legal, financial, social, and health con- 
sequences of the theft attempt 
Low: Incomplete understanding of the 
possible consequences 
High: Has the equipment and expertise 
to process stolen material, either to 
make a weapon or to enrich or alter it for 
easier storage or sale 
Low: Does not have such capabilities 
High: a group of people with some 
experience in theft and criminal activity 
Low: a group or individual inexperi- 
enced in theft and criminal activity 
Seeking: Adversary will take chances 
which threaten his own life or welfare 
Avoiding: Adversary will not accept sig- 
nificant probability of loss of life or cap- 
ture. 
Seeking: Adversary is willing to risk 
lives and welfare of those not in adver- 
sary group 
Avoiding: Adversary unwilling to do this 
Kirkwood and Pollock.” 
Assessing probabilities. :\ detailed 
questionnaire was prepared to assess 
judgments from experts concerning the 
probabilities that a potential adversary 
would have the various levels of attri- 
butes shown in Table 1. In particular, 
unconditional probability distributions 
were assessed over several of the attri- 
butes as well as conditional probability 
distributions over these same attributes, 
given that the level ofone other attribute 
was specified. 
The questionnaire furnished general 
background information on other theft 
situations that are analogous in some 
way to theft from a Nuclear Material 
Safeguards System. The questionnaire 
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TAEKE 2. ADVERSARY THREAT SCENARIOS 
sceM*tltle 
1 Un~flfo~ outsider 
2 Principled outsider 
Disgruntled employee 
Disgruntled employees 






Competent outsider group 
Opportunistic employee 
Opportunistic employees 











Insider terrorist group 
Insider terrorist individual 
Outsider extortionist group 
14 Outside expert 
15 Extorting employee 
16 Extorting executive 
cha- 
~e~f~s~~~~ reasons, prankstar, crazy, f~p~~, but 
not planned; very We Nuclear Material Safeguards System 
(NMSS) knowledge, technically unscphistkated 
Theft for symbolii reasons (ie game-playing, for principle); 
lie or no NMSS knowledge, technically sophistic; could 
have considerable diversion resources, but no inside contacts 
Symbolic theft (eg labour unrest, revenge on the system, 
material-unaccounted-for coverup); NMSS b-level insider, 
such as guard, minor technician, maintenance worker, etc; 
little technical knowledge 
Symbolic theft (eg for principle, revenge, coverup of present 
or future material-unaccounted-for); high level NMSS position 
and contacts (executive ~in~~ator, etc); likely to under- 
stand consequences of theft; high technical knowledge, 
PossiMv a group 
Theft for monetary gain, (eg future sale); lie or no NMSS 
information; technically sophiicat~ has diversion 
resources 
Crime of opportunity, for money; knows one area of NMSS 
(eg guard, loading dock worker, etc); Iittte technical sophisti- 
cation 
Possibly long-term diversionforprofit; well-informed insiders; 
technically sophisticated; have NMSS contacts, control, and 
equipment available 
Crime of opportunity, possibly long&on diversion; well- 
informed insider; technically sophisticated 
Theft to build weapon; little or no NMSS information; high 
technical and processing capabilii; sophiiticated arms and 
adequate manpower (likely to mount a direct frontal attack) 
Theft to buitd weapon; little or no NMSS inf~tion; tech- 
nicalty sophisticated and capable of prccessing material; few 
theft resources (likely to attack fringe of system such as 
material being transported) 
Theft to build weapon; well-informed insiders; technically 
sophisticated with processing capability; have NMSS con- 
tacts, control, and equipment available (may be a large group 
with theft equipment) 
Theft to build weapon; well-informed insider; technically 
sophisticated with processing capability; little NMSS control 
and few contacts (small group or individual) 
Theft for extortion; see 5b for other characteristics 
Theft for extomon; see 5a for other characteristics 
Theft for extortion, see 6a, 6b for othar ~~e~~ 
Theft for extortion; see 8 for other characteristics 
was self-explanatory, but not designed 
to be self-administered. The experts 
were questioned to determine the 
reasons for their answers and to reduce 
the chances of‘ the various usual assess- 
ment errors in judgmental probabili- 
ties.” 
Determining scenario probabilip bounds. 
The two sets of optimization problems 
(5) and (6) were solved to obtain bounds 
on the probabilities for the 19 threat 
scenarios in Table 2, given the informa- 
tion assessed horn the experts. Solution 
of these linear programs is conceptually 
straightforward: there are numerous 
programs available that will solve linear 
programs larger than these. However, 
manually entering the data would be 
very tedious since there w-ere 3 12 differ- 
ent pt’s and several dozen constraints. 
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expert Ba ~xpertcb 
Max Min Max Min 
03333 0 0.01515 0 
025333 0 0.01515 0 
03333 0 004167 0 
oc3333 0 0.04167 0 
04609 0 0.1667 0.10987 
0.0588 0 0.01515 0 
0~0588 0 004545 0 
0.0588 0 0.01515 0 
0.0588 0 0.125 0.02652 
0~0588 0 0.10987 0 
0~0588 0 0.01515 0 
0.0589 0 OGKN 0 
0.0589 0 0.0303 0 
0.0589 0 0.1666 OG6058 
0.0589 0 0.07575 0 
02941 0 0.07575 0 
02941 0 ow545 0 
0.2941 0 0.20833 0.12500 
02941 0 0.32955 0,21593 
Notes:a: using only unconditional probability responses; b: using un- 
conditional probability responses and some conditional probability 
responses. 
To avoid this, a preprocessor program 
was written to take information about 
assessed probabilities and set up the 
appropriate constraint equations for the 
linear programming solution package. 
The entire computer procedure to take 
elicited data, to set up input files for the 
linear programming solution package, 
and to run this to obtain bounds on 
scenario probabilities, was implemented 
as an interactive program on the 
llichigan Terminal System at the Uni- 
versity of Michigan. The linear program 
solution package &IPS, which is part of 
the IBM Mathematical Programming 
System, was utilized. Xlthough the 
program we developed is straight- 
forward to use, the underlying programs 
are fairly complex. It is necessary to 
handle and sort a number of large data 
files which are either created by the pre- 
processor or permanently sorted for use 
by the program. 
In order to simplify program use, data 
was entered using a coding scheme 
similar to that described earlier. For 
example, 10000000G0.3 means “the pro- 
bability that Motivation is Symbolic is 
greater than 0.3.” Similarly 
20000000L30000000 means “the 
probability that hlotivation is hloney is 
less than the probability that 
Xlotivation is Extortion.” Conditional 
probabilities were entered using a slight 
variation in this scheme. For example, 
P6= 1Gl = 4G0.7 means that “the prob- 
ability that attribute 6 (General 
Resources) is High, given that attribute 
1 (hlotivation) is \t’eapon, is greater 
than 0.7.” 
Th e preprocessor program recognizes 
the meaning of these codes and sets up 
the appropriate constraint equations for 
the linear programs. The details of the 
program are presented in Kirkwood and 
Pollock.” 
Results of the application 
The probability assessments discussed 
above were carried out for three experts. 
All three experts found it possible to give 
meaningful answers to both the uncon- 
ditional and conditional probability 
questions. When attempts were made to 
obtain bounds for the scenario proba- 
bilities based on the data for each expert, 
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it turned out there was no set of pt 
obeying the axioms ofprobability theory 
that matched the elicited data. For two 
of the experts, the inconsistency 
remained as long as any of the condi- 
tional probability data were used, while 
with the third, some (but not all) of the 
conditional data could be utilized and 
consistency retained. The bounds that 
result when the inconsistent conditional 
probability assessments are omitted are 
shown in Table 3 where the three 
experts are designated A, B and C. 
This appliction shows that the 
methodology in this paper is a viable 
way of analysing scenarios described by 
attributes with multiple levels. How- 
ever, it is diffkult to assess consistent 
probability information in these com- 
plex situations. 
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